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Last May 1-5 the 52nd Asian Development Bank (ADB) Annual Meeting of the Board of Governors took place in Nadi, Fiji, and as the bank claims that it has been a successful event, NGO Forum on ADB questions the portrayal of the Bank as an institution committed to addressing poverty alleviation in the Asia and the Pacific. This is after the percentage of projects with environmental-safeguard-related risk grew from 73% to 82% following the adoption of the Safeguard Policy Statement (SPS) 2009. In addition, the involuntary resettlement category A or B also grew, from 47% to 51%. Rayyan Hassan, executive director of NGO Forum on ADB stated that “Safeguards cannot be principle-based...peoples lives and environment are not open to interpretation...safeguards, therefore, have to be in forms of explicit binding requirements to ensure the most vulnerable are protected from adverse project and policy impacts”. The share of category B projects also increased (55% in 2010 – 2012 versus 39% in 2007 - 2009) over the same period. There is a need for ADB to scrutinise the large share of category B, given the wide range of potential impacts anticipated. Also, the timely disclosure of environmental social and monitoring reports was found to be problematic for a large number of projects, on account of the need to improve the report quality prior to disclosure. Hemantha Withanage, Executive Director of Center for Environmental Justice, Sri Lanka said that “Current ADB safeguard policy is a very progressive one, however, the implementation is not meeting expectations. Thus, communities still face difficulties with some ADB funded infrastructure projects”. In addition, Safeguard Policy Statement (SPS) did not incorporate additional social dimensions such as core labor standards or gender as explicit safeguard policies, as some other MDBs have done. Annabel Perreras, NGO Forum on ADB’s Advocacy Coordinator on AIIB stated that "There is probably no contention that, if done right, infrastructure development meets crucial needs. However, what we see is an alarming disconnect between the rate of MDBs' financing these projects despite the lack of robust implementation of safeguards. ADB should have the moral responsibility to ensure that its policies enshrined to protect project affected people, their rights, livelihoods and the environment are enforced and strengthened in all phases of the project cycle."

(4 May 2019, Fiji) - This year’s 52nd Asian Development Bank (ADB) Annual Governors’ Meeting is being held in Nadi, Fij. Similar to its neighboring countries in the Pacific, Fiji is on the brink of suffering from the severe impacts of climate change despite its low global carbon emissions. The location of the Annual Meeting intensifies the compelling clamor from CSOs particularly those from climate change vulnerable countries to call out the ADB and put a halt in fueling dirty energy and coal investments in the Asia and Pacific. A study being conducted by the Center for Energy, Ecology, and Development (CEED) and NGO Forum on ADB entitled “Decarbonizing the ADB” reveals that, for the past decade, the Bank’s total “clean energy” investments is equal to its dirty and carbon-intensive energy investments in terms of installed capacity. “The ADB’s carbon-intensive energy lending portfolio does not come as a surprise since it still has not reviewed and updated its severely outdated 2009 Energy Policy. Moreover, the ADB’s list of eligible activities for clean energy and climate investments still consider efficiency improvements and retrofitting for fossil fuel power plants,” Atty. Avril De Torres of CEED explained. Rayyan Hassan, Executive Director of NGO Forum on ADB posed the question, “Why is ADB not making strong commitment to just transition to renewables? To continuously find justification for gas, coal and other fossil fuel intensive projects in 2019 is completely unacceptable.” Sreedhar Ramamurthi, NGO Forum on ADB International Convener and executive director of Environics Trust, India strongly stated that “ADB has the onerous responsibility to look at the long-term, and direct its investment today so that global climate goals are not jeopardized. Decarbonizing is no longer a choice but an urgent imperative”. Under its Strategy 2030, the Bank will increase committed operations supporting climate change mitigation and adaptation by 2030 to 75%, prioritize investments for low GHG emission energy, and encourage Developing Member Country (DMCs) to shift to a low GHG emission development path in line with their nationally determined contributions under the Paris Agreement. However, the Strategy 2030 is still silent on banning financing for fossil fuels and assisting DMCs in phasing out fossil fuel consumption. Eang Vuthy of Equitable Cambodia stated that “[t]he ADB needs to have a clear plan of action on transitioning from fossil fuel energy to fully renewable energy investments and ensuring that these investments - including existing investments -- are carried out in compliance of ADB safeguards with mandatory meaningful consultation with the affected communities, strict avoidance of forced resettlement of people and damaging the environment”. In the Caucasus, the “ADB energy sector investments in Georgia mainly supports new greenfield dam hydro projects in high mountains of Caucasus range. While projects claim that their design to decrease the GHG emissions in reality as science shows the reservoirs greater short term contribution to climate change due to high methane emissions, the creation of water mirrors in that may speed up the process of already speedy process of glaciers melting in Georgia,” says Manana Kochladze of CEE Bankwatch. The last 40 years melting of glaciers heavily impacts the livelihood of the people through increased floods, avalanches and etc. If the Georgian hydropower development continues unabated, this problem will get even worse — in no small part because much of the hydropower expansion will take place in subtropical part of Georgia where vast amounts of methane-producing vegetation will be flooded. The ADBs investment in destructive large hydro power projects have extended to Nepal, Laos and Samoa, often followed by devastating social and environmental impacts on local vulnerable communities. Distributed renewable energy systems The ADB should pursue distributed renewable energy systems because it maximizes energy access and advances energy democracy. It is also cost-competitive and bankable. Unlike fossil fuel technologies and large hydropower and geothermal technologies, new renewables may now be constructed and installed in small or micro sizes at a much shorter period of time, such as solar, wind, and even run-off river. In the Philippines, ADB may pursue a national electrification initiative, specifically through the utilization of renewable energy microgrids. “Renewable energy microgrids, are becoming a prominent and effective alternative in providing clean, affordable, and accessible electricity, especially among unelectrified and remote households, small island grids, and impoverished communities,” according to Atty. Avril De Torres of CEED. Lastly, distributed renewable energy systems advance energy democracy. Energy democracy is reclaiming power to the people. Energy democracy is designed on the principle of no harm to the environment, supports local economies, and contributes to the health and well-being of all people. Thus by investing in distributed renewable energy systems, this also contributes to fulfilling ADB’s commitment to improving governance and meet the Bank’s slated objective of ensuring energy access for all.

The NGO Forum on ADB (“Forum”) strongly remains as an Asian – led independent network of civil society organizations, grassroots organizations and social movements in Asia. Over the years, the Forum maintains its constructive engagement with the Asian Development Bank (ADB) in the course of amplifying the voices of local communities adversely affected by the Bank’s policies and projects. As ADB struggles to remain relevant, adapt to the pressing issues of the region and build on its current Strategy 2020, ADB is redrafting its long – term corporate strategy from here on until 2030. Accordingly, the Strategy 2030’s vision is “to achieve a prosperous, inclusive, resilient and sustainable Asia and Pacific.” First off, this grand vision should be viewed and later on implemented to strongly reflect ADB’s commitment to also ensure stringent enforcement of its safeguards while attempting to address the stark realities and challenges in the region. The Forum flawed consultation design that also transpired on 2 May 2018 failed to deliver adequate opportunity for CSOs to provide substantive inputs into the draft Strategy 2030. The said draft Strategy 2030 was also not translated into other key languages that would enable for a more robust meaningful consultation. This submission will focus on the following key issues: The changing landscape and challenges: concerns on data and basic assumptions The Strategy 2030 provides ambiguous and inadequate stronger commitment to fully support global agreements. Disconnect on the language on energy and climate change in the draft Strategy 2030 alongside with the portfolio and other relevant policy and/or strategic documents of ADB. Inadequate language on how the ADB and its Strategy 2030 implement its own policies vis-à-vis the emergence of new development partners particularly of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). What are the types and modalities of infrastructure investments as well safeguard mechanisms particularly for private sector - operations? Caution and critique on using country – focused approach. The draft Strategy 2030 also fails to include labor and other issues missing. The document is also not gender – sensitive neither gender inclusive. ADB should promote small – holder family farms. General Comments: The changing landscape and challenges: concerns on data and basic assumptions . 1. According to World Bank indicator data on water, sanitation and access to electricity 28.4% of lower income population have access to electricity (WB 2014), with 28.3% lower income population with access to sanitation. Whereas middle income and high income people have most of the secured access to these basic services. This leads to the assumption that infrastructure investments are not targeting the poorest of the poor rather it targets those who can afford it. The data provided in the changing landscape and challenges section are not up – to date. The indicators provided do not have a baseline information on what constitutes as quality access to water, sanitation, electricity, food security, air quality, health care and education. How is ADB Strategy 2030 ensuring that the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) is incorporated into the bank’s planning based on the data set provided? This requires a careful look at the needs of the region from the lens of poorest and the marginalized through representation of accurate poverty and inequality data sets. 2. The narrative also being promoted by ADB in the draft Strategy 2030 is that the infrastructure deficit is the main culprit in the region’s state of poverty. In addition, that this “problem” can only be addressed by the private sector. It can be assumed that overarching narrative is the ‘billions to trillions’ in infrastructure demand, this assumption is based on the 2006 ADB Institutes study that there is a 27 trillion dollar need for infrastructure in Asia, yet a detailed breakdown of this 27 trillion dollar infrastructure and its relationship to achieving the SDGs is not described anywhere in Strategy 2030. The Strategy 2030 should also not be read upon as a response on the increasing competition for development financing in the region. 3. The Strategy 2030 document neither recognizes nor provides a holistic picture on ADB’s development effectiveness in the past 50 years of its operations in Asia. What did ADB actually contribute to should be the basis of its direction in the next decade. The Strategy 2030 provides ambiguous and inadequate stronger commitment to fully support global agreements. 4. In the earlier draft Strategy 2030 which was presented during the November 2016 consultation in the ADB Headquarters, the said draft cited of the Paris Agreement and the Sustainable Development Goals as the overarching objectives of the Strategy 2030. These historic agreements alongside with the Addis Ababa Action Agenda and Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction, while being mentioned in the revised draft Strategy 2030 are now reduced as a preface and context – setting for the operational and strategic priorities of ADB. 5. However as what the Forum have pointed out the Strategy 2030 still lacks adequate guidance on how will ADB help contribute in achieving the targets set forth in these key global commitments. Specifically, the draft Strategy 2030 lacks any indicators to gauge progress in attaining SDGs or clear phase out plans on its energy portfolio of fossil fuel - driven to renewable energy investments. The ADB can play a critical role in contributing and ensuring its borrowers reach the targets set forth in these landmark agreements in order to keep the global temperature significantly low to correct the inequalities in the region. 6. In regards to the Paris Agreement and keeping global temperature below 2 degrees, borrowing governments have their NDCs, ADB Strategy 2030 does not address how it will support the NDCs. Nor does it rule out lending in fossil fuels and committing to zero emissions. This lack of clear guidance to achieving the Paris Agreement shows ADBs lack of commitment to the Agreement and the urgency to respond to the Climate crisis. Disconnect on the language on energy and climate change in the draft Strategy 2030 alongside with the portfolio and other relevant policy and/or strategic documents of ADB. 7. The draft Strategy 2030 provides that “recent technological advances have made renewables more competitive than fossil – fuel derived energy and localized renewable energy mini – grids have expanded access to electricity (page 4).”[1] This provides disconnect on the current energy portfolio and almost a decade old Energy Policy of ADB. The Energy Outlook for Asia and the Pacific on ADB’s Energy Sector Plan indicates that in terms of energy security, the region must continue to rely upon fossil fuels such as oil and gas up to 2035.[2] Furthermore it states that the demand for coal will grow by 50% for economic and technical needs with a caveat that it will be on a slower pace due to energy efficiency and renewable energy development in PRC. 8. Lastly despite the changing energy landscape and as previously mentioned on global agreements to address the impacts of climate change that will increase risks on poverty and vulnerability, ADB’s 2009 Energy Policy have not been reviewed. It still adopts that renewable energy sources include large hydropower in addition to solar, wind, ocean and geothermal energy (para. 46). The devastating impacts of dams on fisheries, water flows and on the livelihoods of project affected communities have been established. This classification to include hydropower on the renewables sub – sector is also reflected under the energy portfolio of ADB. In effect, this provides a false illustration on the Bank’s general objectives under the sector and its commitment to support SDG 7 on ensuring access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all. 9. On climate change and disaster risk, in the case of ADB's emergency assistance loan (EAL) provided to the Philippines in the aftermath of typhoon Yolanda (Haiyan) in 2013, it was also just another business as usual for the Bank. The USD 500M EAL then did not trigger the safeguard policies, as accordingly the loan proceeds were not earmarked for "physical projects" despite one of the objectives that it was supposed to finance rehabilitation of Tacloban. In addition, due to the nature of the loan it went directly into the General Appropriations Act (GAA) or the government budget financing. Since the loan was co - mingled with the rest of the government's general fund, attribution of specific items of the said loan proceeds were also not feasible. Tracking how the loan was translated into actual rehabilitation or livelihood restoration was difficult. ADB is required to apply safeguards for budget support, multi – tranche financing facility (MFF) and policy loans. 10. There was lack of transparency about the disbursement of loan proceeds, to determine actual projects funded by the loan and to exact accountability on its prudent utilization. Years after the super typhoon, the victims have not yet fully recovered. Issues such as substandard housing projects in the relocation sites, no electricity or safe drinking water facilities left some families to actually go back to the danger zones. Nonetheless the loan was still linked with Yolanda recovery and rehabilitation efforts as these were budget items included in the GAA. The ADB however has still maintained that its Yolanda reconstruction efforts rebuild critical infrastructure in the affected areas and supported on livelihood restoration. Inadequate language on how the ADB and its Strategy 2030 implement its own policies vis-à-vis the emergence of new development partners particularly of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. 11. The Strategy 2030 recognizes the emergence of new development partners such as non – traditional donors and establishments like the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and New Development Bank. The draft further provides that “coordination and leveraging through partnerships across national, institutional and public – private boundaries has become critical (para. 13).” Similarly there is inadequate language by which how will the ADB foster these new levels of coordination and leveraging of partnerships. 12. This should also reinforce the Bank’s commitment that in any co – financing project particularly to new institutions should meet ADB’s own safeguards requirements and how will it be implemented vis-à-vis the other institutions’ standards. There should be clarity on how these co – financed projects particularly with AIIB will be implemented. CSOs monitoring the Myingyan Natural Gas Project raised a simple question to all the financiers involved on who is the lead financier for the said project. As this has later on repercussions on how AIIB’s Project Peoples Mechanism (PPM) will be possibly triggered. In the response made by the ADB on 5 February 2018, accordingly “the bank cannot speak for other institutions but where ADB provides finance, the Bank has its own policies, standards and mechanisms that are applicable. These will be applicable irrespective of whether ADB is the lead financier or otherwise.” As for AIIB, accordingly it is the IFC who is the lead financier for the said project. This simple clarification in principle should be easily answered by ADB as it has implications not only on the implementation of the co – financed project at the ground but also on the available redress mechanisms for potentially affected households. 13. On ADB SPS 2010, there are milestone-binding requirements set on Environment, Involuntary Resettlement and Indigenous Peoples for various risk categorizations of ADB Projects. The ADB SPS 2010 remains one of the higher standards among Safeguard policies among all IFIs. The Strategy 2030 does not commit to ‘No Dilution’ of the Safeguards and does not ensure its relevance and applicability to the directions of Strategy 2030 Operational Pillars. 14. In addition during the review of the current Public Communications Policy (PCP), the Forum advocated that co – financing agreements and relevant safeguard documents should be disclosed in a timely manner in the ADB website rather than making them available only upon request. The rationale provided by the Bank that as of to date there is no much demand for these types of documents be disclosed runs inconsistent with the principle of proactive disclosure. This is also short – sighted considering the likelihood of increased co – financed projects particularly with these new actors in the next decade. Since 2016 when AIIB started approving projects, it has co – financed with ADB on 5 projects or 20% of AIIB’s total approved projects as of 2018.[3] The other project in the pipeline includes the Georgia: 280 Nenskra Hydropower Plant. 15. The Forum is not asking for an extensive discussion of how co – financing with AIIB be operationalized in a strategy document. However by citing these two illustrations with Myingyan and with the review on the PCP illustrates the intricacies of forging into new partnerships. It is not enough to merely acknowledge these new institutions existence. ADB’s Strategy, Policy and Review Department should ensure that while crafting the Strategy 2030 it remains consistent both in the policy aspirations and implementation of the Bank’s own safeguards, accountability mechanism and information disclosure policy. What are the types and modalities of infrastructure investments as well safeguard mechanisms particularly for private sector - operations? 16. The narrative of meeting the infrastructure deficits of about USD 26.2 trillion (2016 – 2030) or USD 1.7 trillion in a year has been the dominant tale to fill in the insurmountable investment needs in the region. In addition, this is always followed by the premise that the private sector will be a critical source of financing (para. 15). However leveraging trillions in private investment to finance mega – projects raises questions on accountability and safeguard mechanisms to ensure that the private sector can serve the public good. What are these types and modalities of infrastructure investments? 17. We recognize at one hand the rationale for massive infrastructure projects on energy, water and municipal services; and transport in the context of “enabling access” to social services. However, we robustly do not reconcile this at the expense of inexpedient implementation of the safeguards. While the Private Sector lending of ADB focuses on infrastructure and financial markets, there is no mention of strengthening the PSODs Corporate Governance Framework to ensure compliance of private sector project developers and FIs towards ensuring Strategy 2030 goals and compliance to all ADB standards and policies. 18. Furthermore it is not enough to just to build infrastructure. “Quality infrastructure” should apply safeguards upstream especially in project selection, design and construction where greater weight should be given to the social and environmental impacts of the projects.[4] When the norms and standards are clear, implemented and monitored rigorously, only then that potentially project affected households can hold their respective government and lending institutions such as the ADB accountable. 19. The ADB historically had also taken significant advisory role in the restructuring the power and water sectors of countries in the region since early 1990s. Experiences in the past demonstrate the role ADB played in the privatization of the power sector e.g. ADB TA on corporatization of Dhaka Electric Supply Authority (1992), ADB supported power sector reforms in Gujarat and Madhya Pradesh that led to corporatization and commercialization principles in their power sector (2000); and USD 300 million for reconstructing the power for the Philippines that led to the Power Industry Restructuring Act (EPIRA)[5]. 20. However, privatization had failed to deliver the public benefits it had promised. Power and water sector reforms should not entail the public vulnerable to higher electricity and water rates, loss of adequate regulation mechanisms by the government and transfer of corporate debt. Without stretching the argument and the alarm bells on the direction to which ADB is gearing towards, these are legitimate concerns and the hard lessons that the ADB should not duplicate as it heads on to the next decade. 21. The proposed strategy emphasizes the need to unlock private capital into development projects but fails to elaborate on any need for transparency and accountability of private sector including financial intermediaries. This undisclosed risk guarantee of private capital is a clear threat to communities who will be facing the aftermath of various projects under financial intermediaries and Public-Private Partnerships. 22. In a 2013 Development Effectiveness Committee (DEC) Report it identified a breakdown of the number of projects by safeguard classification from 2002 - 2013.[6] 58 projects or 93% for the Environment projects for capital markets are classified under financial intermediaries (FIs). This reechoes the Forum’s position calling for stronger oversight and exercise of due diligence of the Bank. We raise the question and the onus to ADB to ensure that Environmental and Social Management Systems (ESMS) are responsibly undertaken. Private sector operations should mitigate if not totally avoid potential environmental and social risks. 23. It needs to be mentioned that Strategy 2030 does not emphasize the need for Transparency, Accountability and Due Diligence anywhere in the document as core principles under which the Strategy 2030 will be implemented. Caution and critique on using country – focused approach. 24. One of the Guiding Principles for ADB’s Operations is to use a country – focused approach. Accordingly under the Strategy 2030, “ADB will enhance its policy dialogue and analytical work including on efforts to achieve the country – level targets of the SDGs and the Paris Agreement (para. 23).” Furthermore, the Country Partnership Strategy (CPS) will continue to be the primary platform for defining ADB’s operational focus in a country. Most of the CPS is either outdated, in the process of redrafting or would expire by 2020. It is only Sri Lanka, which has the recent, updated approved CPS with a coverage period for 2018 – 2022. 25. The CPS serves as ADB’s mechanism to design operations to deliver development results at the country level. It is also where key strategic areas of development and sectoral assessment are also identified which will be factors in determining the projects in the pipeline that will be supported by ADB. It is critical then at this juncture, civil society participation is included in shaping the said CPS. However CSO experience in the past shows that either there is lack of information dissemination on the schedule of consultations for CPS or that draft CPS were not adequately disclosed in a timely manner to facilitate a more meaningful consultation process. 26. On an equally relevant point when country systems will be used in environmental and social safeguards delivery, the Forum reiterates its demand that the Bank should clearly uphold the provisions set forth as per the 2009. Safeguard Policy Statement (SPS). The SPS provides the need for “equivalency” and “assessment” to ADB standards before using any form of country system. This is also consistent with the call of the Forum on no dilution and stringent enforcement of the Bank’s safeguard policies among others. 27. NGO Forum on ADB demands ADB to clearly uphold the provisions on country systems as per the ADB SPS 2010 in the Strategy 2030 approach paper, and clearly, state the need for “equivalency” and “assessment” to ADB standards before using any form of country systems. Consequently, the Forum remains steadfast on its call for no dilution of the ADB SPS 2009. 28. Lastly, it has long been underscored by civil society observers that the use of “borrower systems” for IFI - supported projects should not occur in countries with military governments, or those with a track record of human rights violations or high levels of corruption - all of which make the implementation and monitoring of safeguards difficult, if not impossible. On labor and other issues missing 29. The staggering condition of the region is also attributed to the outcome of the failure of the labor market. Generating quality jobs (para. 33) is important particularly the Bank’s support for small and medium – enterprise. However labor balance should also be considered. The World Bank - International Labor Organization adheres to balancing regulation mechanisms to promote productivity. Labor market institutions and the role of women into the formal economy should also be reviewed by the ADB. 30. On its 51st year of operations in the region, the non-recognition of core labor standards in Strategy 2030 clearly shows its lack of respect and commitment toward labor rights and the recent global agreement to provide decent work (SDG 8). The proposed Strategy 2030 is also designed without due recognition to the rights of persons with disabilities, indigenous peoples, and the youth. It is even treading the path of multiplying the vulnerabilities of poor peoples in Fragile and Conflict-Affected Situations by investing in areas with high social, political, economic, cultural and resource-ownership tensions that needs to be settled locally before the influx of any assistance complicates their situation. 31. The strategy has to pay attention to a trend of project militarization. Bank-financed projects, for example in infrastructure such as mining, hire security personnel who are usually armed to protect sites. Women and girls sometimes experience sexual assaults by these security personnel. Some destitute poor women and girls, tempted by small payments, engage in transactional sex with the militaries that can result in unwanted pregnancies and unaffordable single-parenthood. Project militarization epitomizes imbalanced power dynamics by security personnel protecting projects, and women and girls who lack power to protect themselves from assaults. 32. Last July 2017 a faulty gas cylinder exploded in the construction site of Nam Ngiep 1 Hydropower Project in Lao PDR killing 6 Vietnamese workers. The Forum demanded that the Bank should uphold its strictest accountability measures to take immediate action over those responsible in this gross negligence. According to ADB’s own Independent Evaluation Department’s (IED) thematic evaluation on ADB private sector operations, it noted that “the PSOD does not appear to have systematically collected safeguard monitoring reports that can alert ADB to any emerging compliance issue.”[7] 33. The lack of due diligence by the Bank in ensuring that there are appropriate safety standards for equipment use is unacceptable. As such emerging labor issues should also be adequately emphasized in the draft Strategy 2030. Has this been the case otherwise such an accident could have been prevented. The explosion at Nam Ngiep 1 is also a clear illustration of exposing the risks of inadequate coordination among ADB’s Private Sector Operations Department (PSOD), borrower, implementing agency and its sub – contractor/s. The ADB has to enforce strict regulation to ensure full applicability of all provisions of the safeguards policy; and ensure the prevention of future incidents like this from happening. The document is also not gender – sensitive neither gender inclusive. 34. Integrating gender consideration issues does not only pertain to mainstreaming. It is also about protection particularly of women through safeguard implementation. If gender elements are being neglected at the project level, the situation of women can therefore not improve. If safeguards are not being diligently implemented, full benefits including protection for women cannot be warranted. ADB should promote small – holder family farms. 35. On agriculture and food security, the concept of sustainable agriculture process is also striking to be missing in the document. ADB should explore the viability of promoting small - holder family farms which are more productive as compared to big holder farms. Small producers and fisher folks should also be mentioned in the draft Strategy 2030. While the Bank is purportedly enhancing food security and food safety issues were articulated, this is still inadequate, as the nutritional aspects of these should also be considered. The ADB Strategy 2030 should indicate the importance of sustaining indigenous agricultural seed, local and traditional agricultural practices and subsistence farming demands as core objectives in their agricultural investments. Concluding Thoughts: 36. The draft Strategy 2030 should develop indicators or parameters to meaningfully track its progress on its global commitments on the SDGs, Addis Ababa Action Agenda, Paris Agreement and Sendai Framework on Disaster Risk Reduction, over the next 10 years. When redrafting Country Partnership Strategies, ADB and borrowing governments should also reflect these global commitments in identifying the projects in the pipeline, sectoral focus and technical assistance provided on key issues of policy development. 37. Similarly in order for the Strategy 2030 to be fully implemented, the current language on energy, climate change and disaster risk and the ambitious development goals should all be viewed and enforced alongside with the relevant policy and/or strategic documents of the ADB. Outdated documents such as ADB’s Energy Policy should be revisited to ensure consistency on these changing realities and landscape of development financing on energy. The ADB should ensure that the objectives set forth in the Strategy 2030 are coherent and cascaded into the relevant accompanying policies, strategies and investment portfolios. Contributors: Aksi Indonesia Both ENDS Centre for Environmental Justice NGO Forum on ADB Public Services International (PSI) Sri Lanka Nature Group This was referenced from the Asian Development Outlook 2018. ADB. Energy Outlook for Asia and Pacific. October 2013. These ADB – AIIB co - financed projects are as follows: 1) Pakistan National Motorway M4 Project; 2) Myanmar: Myingyan Power Plant Project; 3) Azerbaijan: Trans Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline Project; 4) Bangladesh: Natural Gas Infrastructure and Efficiency Improvement Project; and 5) Georgia: Batumi Bypass Road Project. Alexander, N. The Big Gamble: How Sustainable are Global Efforts to Leverage Private Investment in Infrastructure. April 2018. A Handbook on the Asian Development Bank: The ADB and its Operations in Asia ADB, Development Effectiveness Committee Report (DEC) 2013, Private Sector Operations ADB’s Independent Evaluation Department. ADB Private Sector Operations: Contributions to Inclusive and Environmentally Sustainable Growth. Thematic Evaluation Study. 2013. Signatories: Action Paysanne Contre La Faim, Democratic Republic of the Congo Bank Information Center Europe, Europe BRICS Feminist Watch, International Center for International Environmental Law, International Community Empowerment and Social Justice Foundation, Nepal Conectas Human Rights, Brazil Conseil Regional des Organisations Non Gouvernementales de Developpement, Democratic Republic of the Congo Crude Accountability, International Echoes of Women in African Initiatives, Nigeria Friends of the Earth, USA International Rivers, International Oyu Tolgoi Watch, Mongolia Radha Paudel Foundation, Nepal Rivers without Boundaries, Mongolia Youth for Environment Education and Development Foundation, Nepal Download the letter here.

JIN LIQUN President Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank B9 Financial Street, Xicheng District Beijing 10033 People’s Republic of China Copied to: Dr. D.J. Pandian, Vice President and Chief Investment Officer Dr. Joachim von Amsberg, Vice President – Policy and Strategy Mr. Hamid Sharif, Compliance, Effectiveness and Integrity Unit (CEIU) Director General Ms. Laurel Ostfield, Head of Communications and Development Mr. Oliver Barron, Executive Officer, Office of the President Ms. Michaela Bergman, Principal Social Development Specialist Members of the Board of Directors of the AIIB CSO Joint Statement to AIIB on Gender Dear Pres. Jin, In the Asia – Pacific and beyond, the role of gender equality and women’s rights in the achievement of development goals at the individual, household, community, workforce, and societal levels cannot be understated. The extent of power, influence, and resources of international financial institutions (IFIs) including the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) to reduce or impose structural barriers to women’s economic rights cannot be ignored. In the past, civil society organizations have documented that IFI – led projects and policies have resulted in a gender-unequal distribution of unpaid care work and access to healthcare facilities, schools, and livelihood opportunities. In the case of some sovereign ADB – funded projects particularly the Khulna - Jessore Drainage Project in Bangladesh project – affected women were not included in meaningful consultations and design of the said Project. None of the resettled women were able to found employment opportunities related to the Cambodia Railway Rehabilitation Project. The specific measures to ensure women had access to vocational training or saving groups were also not implemented. Similarly in the ADB – financed Kolkata Environmental Project an estimate of 2,880 affected households mostly canal bank dwellers were displaced. Some of the affected families were given a flat measuring 15.5 ft by 10 ft. The small size of these flats led to several difficulties such as girls married off earlier as there was a small space for them to stay and indirect harassment among others. In these cases, women and girls often experience twice the burden of the unintended and adverse impacts of poorly designed IFI – funded projects This has resulted in gender discrimination as well as gender - unequal social and economic power relationships. The large-scale investments by IFIs often change not only entire economies but of societies too. AIIB and its co-financiers pledge support into building large-scale infrastructure such as road, railways, high voltage transmission lines, and power – sector stations. This also expands to special economic zones along the stretches of the so-called infrastructure corridors. The land being used in support for local livelihoods such as for food production is now claimed for infrastructure and production halls. As a result, women have less and lesser access to land and natural resources. Their livelihoods, which used to depend on land and natural resources, are becoming increasingly dependent on temporary lowly paid jobs in the economic zones and corridors. Such practices impose threats and risks where labor standards are applied much more loosely than what national laws dictate. Economic development that is based on the extraction of natural resources and exploitation of laborers is unlikely to bring positive change for women’s economic independence and equality. In 2015, World Bank developed its new Gender Strategy for 2016 – 2023. However, its Environment and Social Framework even in conjunction with the Guidance Notes are still inadequate to reflect the bank’s gender commitments at the project level implementation. Whereas in the case of the ADB, the 2009 Safeguard Policy Statement include requirements for gender considerations with regards to project impact and risk assessment, an involvement of women and gender considerations in consultations as well as requirements for gender sensitive and responsive grievance mechanism. However, there is still the absence of binding gender safeguards and lack of assessment on how these gender considerations are implemented to ensure the protection and participation of women in all phases of the project cycle. AIIB as a new IFI established in 2016 has an opportunity to set the bar higher than other IFIs towards a more progressive approach towards safeguards and protection of women both at the policy and project implementation level. Gender considerations should also be reflected particularly for private sector-led operations, which have been criticised for its lesser accountability and transparency measures. It is in these contexts, that we CSOs demand that gender - intersectional issues such as resettlement/displacement and loss of livelihoods, particularly affecting women and girl – children, be integrated into all policies and project implementation. Project – affected women have also absorbed severe adverse impacts of poor project implementation and exclusion from meaningful consultations. To remedy this, AIIB investments and policies must strengthen the implementation of gender perspectives and ensure gender – responsive and inclusive infrastructure development financing. As civil society organizations, we urge the AIIB to mandatorily require that all Bank policies and operations identify and prevent potential gender discrimination against project – affected persons, particularly women, and prevent women’s suffering from forced displacement, loss of livelihoods and gender injustices. Specifically, we ask AIIB to: 1. Protect project-affected households, particularly women and girls, from project risks and impacts. The AIIB commitment to “sustainable growth” had identified that it will ensure safe and healthy working conditions for all workers, promote gender equality, encourage inclusive development and empower vulnerable groups. However, to guarantee that the AIIB consistently promotes gender equality it should ensure the protection of women and mainstream gender issues by identifying and addressing potential and actual gender disparities in the implementation of AIIB – financed projects. Project – affected women should not be viewed merely as oppressed victims but as rights – holders and significant stakeholders in decision – making processes. Lastly, AIIB policies should uphold the protection of project – affected peoples, especially women and girls, against direct and indirect sexual harassment. 2. Develop a strong Directive on the Environmental and Social Policy (ESP) with gender considerations. In the AIIB’s Environment and Social Framework (ESF), it highlights the importance of gender equality i.e. “the Bank recognizes the importance of gender equality for successful and sustainable economic development and the need for inclusiveness and gender responsiveness in the Projects it supports (para. 14).” However a close scrutiny on the 4 – page Directive on Environmental and Social Policy which “aims to facilitate the implementation of the Bank’s ESP, including the Environmental and Social Standards (ESS)” clearly shows the absence of how to operationalize the commitments and gender considerations identified in the Policy. The Policy provides for: A “gender – sensitive, culturally appropriate and readily accessible project-level grievance redress mechanism to all affected people (para. 63); Gender was also identified in the conduct of an environment and social assessment for the proposed Project in identifying direct, indirect, cumulative and induced risks and impacts (on ESS 1: Environment and Social Assessment and Management); Describes a meaningful consultation that is gender inclusive, accessible, responsive and tailored to the needs of vulnerable groups (on ESS 1); Taking gender into account in conducting the planning for involuntary resettlement through the survey of land and assets, full census of persons to be displaced and evaluation of socio- economic conditions specifically related to involuntary resettlement risks and impacts (on ESS 2: Involuntary Resettlement); and Undertake a culturally appropriate and gender-sensitive social assessment (on ESS 3: Indigenous Peoples). Despite these provisions in the Policy, the application of gender mainstreaming particularly in operationalizing the ESP through the Directive is hardly visible, if not entirely non – existent. This might be a case of “gender evaporation” where gender considerations are integrated into the Policy and rhetoric but might possibly disappear in the actual implementation of projects. Local community and other stakeholder consultations should have balanced representation by women and men. 3. The AIIB should develop a mechanism to strengthen the capacity of its Clients to implement the gender considerations identified in the ESF and Policy. The ESF provides that the “Bank supports its Clients to identify potential gender-specific opportunities as well as gender-specific adverse risks and impacts under their Projects and to develop mitigation measures to avoid or reduce such impacts and risks.” Furthermore, it also encourages Clients to enhance the design of their Projects in an inclusive and gender- responsive manner to promote equality of opportunity and women’s socio-economic empowerment (para. 14) [Note: Emphasis supplied].” This language essentially places the onus to the Clients whether or not they will implement the gender considerations identified in the ESF and Policy. To further ensure the seriousness of the Bank in recognizing the significance of gender equality, it should also develop the capacity building of its Clients to adhere to and implement these gender considerations. The AIIB should also strengthen its due diligence and oversight in ensuring that women be involved in meaningful participation and consultations related to all project stage processes from identification and design of feasibility studies prior to Board approval, to planning, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation. This should also include the identification and assessment of existing and new technologies for projects to improve the condition of women. The AIIB should also integrate women’s experiences and knowledge into both policy and project implementation. 4. Mandatorily collect gender-disaggregated baseline and monitoring data from project identification to completion stages. The AIIB provides that, “Where relevant, use gender-disaggregated data and analysis and consider enhancing the design of the Project to promote equality of opportunity and women’s socio-economic empowerment (on ESS 1) [Note: Emphasis supplied].” While this is not the opportune time to consider any changes in the language of the ESF and Policy, the AIIB should exercise due diligence over its Clients in the implementation of collecting gender disaggregated baseline and monitoring data at all project stages particularly during the identification of project – affected persons. This would further ensure gender - equal sharing of project benefits and opportunities. Similarly, this would ensure that the identified mitigation measured adequately responds to the needs of the project – affected women. 5. As AIIB is beginning to finance more stand-alone infrastructure projects, its ESF delivery by its borrowers and clients on gender dimensions, issues and obligations will be expected to meet due diligence delivery and compliance. The AIIB is also obligated to ensure the necessary steps for monitoring and oversight of its clients. As such AIIB policies as a requirement for the Banks client to meet, should uphold international human right frameworks and standards including Convention on the Discrimination of all forms Against Women (CEDAW) and develop measures to ensure the safety and security of the women in communities and women environmental defenders. Contributors: Aksi Indonesia ActionAid India American Friends Service Committee, Myanmar Asian Peoples Movement on Debt and Development (APMDD) Bank Information Center USA Signatories: BothENDS Climate Watch Thailand Centre for Environmental Justice, Sri Lanka Centre for Development and Research Action, India Coastal Livelihood and Environmental Action Network (CLEAN), Bangladesh Environics, India Indian Social Action Forum (INSAF) Gender Action Greenwatershed, China Nash Vek, Kyrgyzstan NGO Forum on ADB Oxfam Paung Ku, Myanmar Programme on Women's Economic Social and Cultural Rights (PWESCR) Solidaritas Perempuan, Indonesia Signatories: Action Paysanne Contre La Faim, Democratic Republic of the Congo Bank Information Center Europe, Europe BRICS Feminist Watch, International Center for International Environmental Law, International Community Empowerment and Social Justice Foundation, Nepal Conectas Human Rights, Brazil Conseil Regional des Organisations Non Gouvernementales de Developpement, Democratic Republic of the Congo Crude Accountability, International Echoes of Women in African Initiatives, Nigeria Friends of the Earth, USA International Rivers, International Oyu Tolgoi Watch, Mongolia Radha Paudel Foundation, Nepal Rivers without Boundaries, Mongolia Youth for Environment Education and Development Foundation, Nepal Download letter here. #gender #AIIB

NGO Forum on ADB will be hosting 2 panels in the Civil Society Program of the Asian Development Bank's (ADB) Annual Governor's Meeting (AGM). Please see the details below - ADB has pledged to meet the Paris Agreement by further mobilizing public and private finance to help countries reduce greenhouse gas emissions and adapt to climate change. Together with other multilateral development banks, ADB has committed to considering “climate change across strategies, programs, and operations to deliver more sustainable results, with a particular focus on the poor and most vulnerable.” In view of the provisions in ADB’s 2009 Energy Policy, the panel will discuss ADB-supported energy projects in selected developing member countries in the context of achieving adequate and affordable energy by promoting energy efficiency and renewable energy, consistent with the principles of the Paris Agreement. Panelists Avril De Torres Research and Policy Head, Center for Energy, Ecology and Development Robert Guild Chief Sector Officer, Sustainable Development and Climate Change Department, ADB Rayyan Hassan Executive Director, NGO Forum on ADB Hemantha Withanage Executive Director, Centre for Environmental Justice The ADB’s Safeguard Policy Statement (SPS) aims to promote sustainability of project outcomes by protecting the environment and people from projects' potential adverse impacts where possible, and helping borrowers to strengthen their safeguard systems and develop the capacity to manage environmental and social risks. National instruments, environmental laws, and social protection mechanisms of selected borrowing countries are, at times, not at par with ADB’s SPS standards. In many cases, while policies were strong on paper, implementing agencies face many challenges in upholding ADB safeguards standards. Some ciivil society groups, including the NGO Forum on ADB, believe that there is no clear policy framework in ensuring safeguards in ADB supported projects that are cofinanced with other multilateral development banks. The session will discuss issues and concerns related to the implementation of ADB’s SPS. Panelists Walter Kolkma Director, Country and Thematic Evaluation Division, Independent Evaluation Department, ADB Hassan Mehedi Chief Executive, Coastal Livelihood and Environmental Action Network (CLEAN) Annabel Perreras Advocacy Coordinator on AIIB, NGO Forum on ADB Rajeev Sharma South Asia Projects Director, Building and Wood Workers International Woochong Um Director General and concurrently Chief Compliance Officer, Sustainable Development and Climate Change Department, ADB Hemantha Withanage Executive Director, Centre for Environmental Justice Live stream of the event will be available at NGO Forum on ADB's Facebook page https://www.facebook.com/forum.adb/.

Global Charter for Universal Social Protection Rights by all, for all We, progressive social movements, concerned with the growing social distress of people all over the world and faced with multiple problems of war, environmental degradation and climate change, rising inequalities and persistent poverty, economic crises, austerity policies and growing authoritarianism, erosion of all human rights, discrimination and intolerance, hereby plead for universal social protection to be taken as a tool for peace and social justice: Recalling the old truth that peace is not possible without social justice, as was stated already in the Constitution of the ILO in 1919. Recalling that the community of nations has developed a major set of rights, more particularly a Universal Declaration on Human Rights, two international Covenants on political and civil rights, on the one hand, and economic, social and cultural rights on the other hand, including a right to an adequate standard of living. Other legal instruments include more specific rights of children, women and indigenous people, as well as a right to development. These rights are universal, indivisible and inalienable. Recalling, furthermore, that many of these rights have been adopted by regional charters, conventions and declarations and that the ILO has adopted a series of conventions, recommendations and declarations on specific economic and social rights, more particularly a Convention on the minimum standards for social security in 1952, a programme on decent work, a set of Core Labour Standards, a Declaration on Social Justice and a recommendation on national social protection floors in 2012. Recalling, finally, that the United Nations, in its many global conferences and more recently in its 2015 programme for Sustainable Development Goals has recognized the need for social protection and the reduction of inequalities, people’s social rights as well as their link with environmental policies and rights. Considering that social protection is justified by a social justice imperative, by aiming at sustainable human development and security, providing all people with an opportunity for a life in dignity. Considering that social protection consists of measures aimed at reconciling civil and political citizenship, based on equality, with economic and social citizenship rights and the equal worth of all individuals. Considering that social protection is intrinsically linked to a social process of structural social solidarity and is not a concept of charity. Considering that social protection is a very broad concept, going beyond poverty reduction, social security and social assistance, and is aimed at eradicating and preventing poverty, reducing inequalities and ensuring decent livelihoods for all. Considering that social protection is part of a reproduction process that cannot be de-linked from a production process while both should be aimed at the sustainability of life. This means that the components of social protection cannot be conceived of separately from the economic activities in their broadest sense. Considering, therefore, that social protection must consist of material and immaterial elements, monetary allowances and additional in-kind support where appropriate, social services, environmental resources and factors of production. Considering that major parts of social protection can and are to be realized immediately, though other parts will necessarily be realized in a progressive way, depending on available resources. Considering that social protection is a primary responsibility of States, with important responsibilities to be taken by subnational authorities and social organisations, a substantial contribution is to be provided by international solidarity. International financial organisations must therefore duly take into account the need for resources for social policies and be accountable to all borrowing governments. Considering that social protection can only fulfil the needs of people if it comes about in a participatory and democratic way, involving citizens and reflecting the diversity of their means and needs as a precondition for human development. Deploring that as of today, globally, only 29 % of people have access to comprehensive social security systems. Deploring that the neoliberal globalisation has pushed countries into a race to the bottom, displacing people and causing environmental damage, diminishing fiscal means, deregulating labour markets, reducing taxes and cutting social expenditures. Deploring that the current economic and debt crisis, followed and deepened by austerity policies and growing authoritarianism have seriously eroded economic and social rights the world over, whereas populist regimes undermine social protection’s emancipatory dimension. Deploring that labour markets are faced with negative developments of growing informalisation, precariousness and vulnerability. Deploring that the welfare states in a certain number of countries have not adapted to the fundamental changes of economies and societies of the past decades, more particularly to past and future technological changes. Stating that the current and future technological developments will have major consequences for labour markets that need to be tackled, amongst others, with measures of social protection, so as to turn them in positive assets, more particularly for access to social protection. Welcoming the most recent international initiatives on social protection, such as the ILO Recommendation on social protection floors and the Sustainable Development Goals, stressing the need for their effective implementation. We therefore agree to state that the right of all people, all over the world, to universal and comprehensive social protection systems must be based on the following principles: Social protection systems should be rights- and solidarity-based, embedded in national laws, and defined as a primary responsibility of public authorities. Social protection mechanisms should be organized on a non-profit basis. States are to guarantee comprehensive social protection systems through sustainable and solidarity-based financing, fair social contribution systems, fair and progressive tax policies and international solidarity mechanisms. Social protection mechanisms, as homogeneous as possible, should be made available for all citizens and residents, throughout the life cycle, independent of labour market status, even if benefits, rights and obligations can differ according to national contexts, agreements and sectors. Social protection mechanisms should at least respect the norms of ILO convention 102 of 1952, that is including health insurance, medical care and sickness benefits, unemployment benefits, labour accident insurance and benefits, pensions, family and maternity benefits, invalidity allowances, survivor’s benefits. Social protection mechanisms should also consist of a series of social services, to be agreed on at the national level, but at least comprehend a right to water, to education (up to tertiary level), public transport, energy and communication, housing and vocational training. States should adopt the decent work programme of the ILO, as well as the core labour standards comprising more particularly the right to organize and the right to collective bargaining, social dialogue, banning of the worst forms of child labour, forced and bonded labour. States should ensure the implementation of existing minimum wages and, if lacking, adopt, with the involvement of social partners, living minimum wages that guarantee decent livelihoods for, all workers. States should adopt adequate social assistance mechanisms so as to avoid that people fall into poverty. States should take the necessary measures so as to eliminate the gender gap in labour participation, status and pay. States are to ensure non-contributory pensions and other allowances for people who are unable to participate in the labour market. States should take the necessary measures so as to eliminate all discrimination based on gender, race, ethnicity, nationality, religion or sexual orientation. States should take the necessary measures so as to avoid social dumping and reduce informality and precariousness, in line with ILO Recommendation 204, adopting clear rules for the emerging ´collaborative´ economy and the dependent self-employed, redefining and appropriately measuring ´labour´, ’employment’, ‘self-employment’ and domestic work, and introduce adequate systems of labour inspection. Emerging new technologies should duly be taken into account. States should take the necessary measures as to guarantee everyone’s livelihood, including the protection of the common goods and a right to land for peasants. States should take the necessary measures to provide social protection and guarantee labour rights for all migrants. During humanitarian crises, States should assist displaced people, internally and refugees, as well as to provide safe ways to travel for both refugees and labour migrants, guaranteeing basic human rights at all times. In the development of their social protection mechanisms States are to fully involve representative social partners and civil society, so that the agreed arrangements can be considered their own; social partners and citizens should be fully, structurally and effectively involved in the design, implementation and monitoring of the systems. Social protection mechanisms established by social organisations should be supported and as much as possible be integrated into universal systems and not be undermined by a formalisation process. So as to make democratic citizen’s participation possible, States and social movements should organize political education and training sessions at the national and the local level, so as to make people aware of their rights, the mechanisms to demand the full realization of their rights and the way social protection is organized and financed. States should organize the financing of their social protection systems in such a way that all income categories contribute in a fair and equitable way, the strongest shoulders bearing the largest burden. In their international trade, investment and other agreements, States should include binding rules concerning human rights, environmental and labour rights, as well as fair and progressive tax systems. A binding treaty at the global level should ensure that IFI’s and TNCs respect human rights. States should organize their social protection mechanisms in such a way that they lead to social and economic transformation, leading to just, fair and sustainable societies, preserving human and natural life. We call on civil society organisations to refer to these principles when campaigning for universal social protection systems, by all and for all. We call on parliamentarians globally to advocate for and legislate universal, comprehensive and effective social protection systems. We also call on them to monitor States’ implementation of their social protection programs and systems in particular, effective oversight on resources and budgets. We call on governments to take this Charter as a guideline for social policies and to support all initiatives, politically and financially, aimed at achieving the principles of this Charter. Having read this Global Charter for Social Protection Rights, I/we want to endorse this initiative. This support does not concern all the different and detailed points of the twenty principles, which have to be adopted in a national or local context according to the needs of people, but the process to work on social commons in a democratic and participatory way, aimed at contributing to social justice and social transformation. *** To express your support visit http://globalsocialprotectioncharter.eu/support/

On October 31, 2018, the World Bank Group Board of Directors approved new additions to the Inspection Panel’s “Toolkit” and extended the review period for six months to further consider three additional measures. While the reforms adopted by the Board are welcome, they fall far short of the stated goal to “modernize” the world’s first independent accountability mechanism (IAM). We, the undersigned civil society organizations, wish to express our disappointment that three important measures—monitoring, dispute resolution, and extending the overly restrictive time limit on eligibility—were not approved within the initial timeline of the review, and urge the Board to use the additional time to ensure these measures are adopted. Now the only IAM that lacks monitoring and dispute resolution functions, the Inspection Panel can no longer be considered a leading innovation in development finance unless these changes are made. The functions that were approved—including adding an advisory role to the Panel’s mandate and allowing the Panel to share additional information with Requesters—represent a commendable first step by the Board of Directors in demonstrating its commitment to enhancing accountability at the World Bank Group. However, adding monitoring and dispute resolution functions and extending the narrow time limit for Requesters to file a complaint, would have gone much further in addressing the serious deficiencies and conflicts of interest inherent in the current system. Putting off further discussion on these more important measures calls into question the Board’s commitment to strengthening the system overall and could undermine the effort entirely if they are not ultimately agreed upon. While the Panel remains under-equipped as an independent accountability mechanism, the Board’s decision on October 31 did include language intended to bolster the management- controlled “Grievance Redress Service (GRS), including the ability to maintain a roster of expert mediators to facilitate resolution of complaints and to add a new escalation point to the World Bank’s CEO.” We are concerned that this indicates a misunderstanding of the purpose and practice of dispute resolution versus a management-led grievance office. While both have their strengths and important roles to play, dispute resolution and a management-led grievance office are very different and should not be viewed as interchangeable. In its Bank Procedure, the GRS is described as “led by Management,” and its mandate is to help Bank staff develop a response to concerns presented by project-affected people, either through a complaint or not. It is not an independent or voluntary dispute resolution process where the parties—the complainant(s) and the Bank’s client—may directly negotiate with each other to find a lasting solution to a conflict that will outlive the Bank’s involvement in the project. As stated in civil society comments on the review of the Inspection Panel’s Toolkit, a high degree of independence from Bank management and the Bank’s client is also necessary to convene a dispute resolution process that communities will trust, like the dispute resolution processes convened by the Compliance Advisor Ombudsman (CAO), the IAM for the International Finance Corporation (IFC) and Multilateral Insurance Guarantee Agency (MIGA). As an extension of management and the CEO, the GRS is simply not designed to provide a neutral space for the parties to a dispute to negotiate a lasting agreement that engenders buy-in from all sides. The Inspection Panel was once a leading innovation in development finance, giving communities a voice where it had not previously existed. We call on the Board to reinstate the Panel’s position as a leader by ensuring that all remaining recommendations below are implemented: The Panel should be authorized to monitor all instances of non-compliance to ensure that harm is remedied. The Panel should have a dispute resolution function similar to the CAO’s. The cut-off date for filing complaints should be extended to at least two years following; project completion or loan closure, whichever comes later. In the wake of the Inspection Panel’s 25th anniversary, we hope that the Board will renew its interest in ensuring that the Panel has the basic tools it needs to provide meaningful redress and institutional accountability. Signatories Africa Dynamique pour la Promotion et la Protection de l’Artisanat Minier au Tchad (DYPRODAMIT), Chad Justice Pour Tous, Democratic Republic of Congo Observatoire d’Etudes et d’Appui à la Responsabilité Sociale et Environnementale (OEARSE), Democratic Republic of Congo Action des Chrétiens Activistes des Droits de l’Homme a Shabunda (ACADHOSHA), Democratic Republic of Congo Action Paysanne Contre la Faim, Democratic Republic of Congo Conseil Regional des ONG de Développement, Democratic Republic of Congo Jamaa Resource Initiatives, Kenya Narasha Community Development Group, Kenya Oxfam International, Kenya Save Lamu, Kenya Le Collectif des Organisations de Défense des Droits de l’Homme et de la Démocratie (CODDHD), Niger Lumière Synergie pour le Développement, Senegal African Coalition for Corporate Accountability (ACCA), South Africa WoMin Alliance, South Africa Foundation for Environmental Management and Campaign Against Poverty (FEMAPO), Tanzania Learning Minds Africa (LeMA), Tanzania Mazingira Network Tanzania (MANET), Tanzania Tanganyika Law Society, Tanzania Africa Centre for Policy Facilitation (ACPF), Uganda Buliisa Initiative for Rural Development Organisation (BIRUDO), Uganda Friends with Environment in Development (FED), Uganda Initiative for Social and Economic Rights (ISER), Uganda Uganda Consortium on Corporate Accountability (UCCA), Uganda World Voices Uganda (WVU), Uganda Asia Access Bangladesh Foundation, Bangladesh Equitable Cambodia, Cambodia Centre for Financial Accountability, India Oyu Tolgoi Watch, Mongolia Rivers without Boundaries Coalition Mongolia Pakistan Fisher Folks Forum, Pakistan Participatory Development Initiatives (PDI) Pakistan Umeedenoo, Pakistan NGO Forum on ADB, Philippines Centre for Environmental Justice, Sri Lanka Sri Lanka Nature Group, Sri Lanka Manushya Foundation, Thailand Europe EcoLur, Armenia Eurodad, Belgium Za Zemiata - Friends of the Earth Bulgaria CEE Bankwatch Network, Czech Republic Green Alternative, Georgia Urgewald, Germany National Society of Conservationists - Friends of the Earth Hungary Bank Information Center Europe, Netherlands Both ENDS, Netherlands Centre for Research on Multinational Corporations (SOMO), Netherlands SLUG/Debt Justice Norway Focus Association for Sustainable Development, Slovenia Ecoaction, Ukraine Bretton Woods Project, United Kingdom Forest Peoples Programme, United Kingdom Gender & Development Network, United Kingdom Latin America FARN, Argentina Foundation for the Development of Sustainable Policies (FUNDEPS), Argentina Conectas Human Rights, Brazil Middle East & North Africa ArabWatch Regional Coalition for Just Development, Regional North America MiningWatch Canada Accountability Counsel, United States Bank Information Center, United States Center for International Environmental Law, United States Crude Accountability, United States Friends of the Earth U.S., United States Gender Action, United States Inclusive Development International, United States International Accountability Project (IAP), United States International Labor Rights Forum (ILRF), United States Sacharuna Foundation, United States

To GCF Board Members at the 21st GCF Board Meeting in Manama, Bahrain Dear GCF Board Members, We, Civil Society Groups, urge you to reject the approval of FP 083 "Indonesia Geothermal Resource Risk Mitigation Project” proposed by the World Bank. This project proposal was prepared hastily, and did not undergo proper process of information disclosure and consultation with indigenous peoples and local communities who could be potentially affected by the project. It also failed to address all the environmental, social and gender aspects of the sub-projects. Details of our concerns with this proposed project are as follows: 1.The Project does not consider the ‘ring of fire’ fragile ecosystem. All documents related to the FP 083 did not recognize the geothermal site, the tectonic plates boundary movements and potentially devastating risks in and around the project site. Indonesia is composed of more than 17,000 small and big islands located on the 'ring of fire' - a volcanic belt where many earthquakes and volcanic eruptions occur. The volcanoes in Indonesia are among the most active of the Pacific Ring of Fire. They are formed due to subduction zones of three main active tectonic plates namely the Eurasian Plate, Pacific Plate, and Indo-Australian Plate. Some of most active volcanoes are Kelud and Mount Merapi on Java island, both responsible for thousands of deaths in the region. Other active volcanos are Sinabung in Sumatra,Gunung Agung in Bali, and Gunung Slamet in Java, all showing volcanic activity since 2013. About 90 percent of all earthquakes occur along the Ring of Fire, which is dotted with 75 percent of all the active volcanoes on earth. Just weeks ago Indonesia experienced earthquake with tsunami in Lombok, Palu, and Dongala with devastating impacts to the local peoples – resulting to deaths of more than a thousand, loss of properties and livelihoods of the communities. 2. The Project does not provide any description of the fragile ecosystem of geothermal reserves and sites that is vulnerable to volcano eruption and volcanoes induced earthquakes. Geothermal potentials in Indonesia are on the volcanoes and around 70% from the forest area. The information in Figure 3: Designated Geothermal Work Areas by Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources on page 10 of the proposal, did not disclose the fact that those listed work areas are on the foot and/or surrounded by volcanoes. It seems that the World Bank has forgotten the experience of Sidoarjo volcano mudflow in 2006 that poured out mud at a rate of 180,000 m3/day at its peak due to the blowout of a natural gas well drilled by PT Lapindo Brantas, a company owned by a politician and a former Indonesian minister. The company’s officials argued that it was caused by a distant earthquake, but studies show that it was triggered by drilling activity occurred near the arc of volcanoes where geothermal activities were abundant. 3. The project must take into account the past experience in financing geothermal projects in Indonesia. The Clean Technology Fund (CTF) in 2013 developed a financing plan for geothermal development in Indonesia totally in the amount of US$ 3,1 billion composed from IBRD (US$ 655 million), ADB (US$ 630 million) and IFC/ADB (US$ 725 million). The World Bank has to conduct an assessment of multiple geothermal project impacts (in this case this CTF financing plan) before financing another project particularly related to volcanic activities on its environmental, gender and social impacts. Otherwise, the same impacts and problems will be repeated. 4. The Project does not provide assurance that exploration/drilling activities on the sites of sub-projects will not induce fractures and earthquakes. The Project indicated that it will implement 20 individual projects and lists additional 45 potential projects that will be supported by GCF (see Annex 1: List of Potential Pipeline Projects). Most of the project sites listed are located near the volcanoes, even those in small islands. Given the nature of activity to be undertaken by FP083, the risk of inducing devastating earthquake is high and the project failed to provide information on how to address this. Moreover, if the exploration/drillings activities do not result in confirmation of the geothermal sources, while land/forest clearings already conducted with impacts of mudflow into the river system and degradation of forest ecosystem as shown in some cases in geothermal explorations in Central Java, the project failed to provide information on how to address the problems and responsible to restore and compensate the loss and destruction. 5. The World Bank is yet to disclose locations of those 20 sub-projects and submit the environmental, gender and social impact assessment of each individual project for consideration. The proposal does not provide detailed information on individual sub-projects, its environmental and social assessments (ESS) and well as gender assessment and action plan. Since this is a high-risk project in a fragile ecosystem of volcanoes and earthquake, each individual each project has to present respective ESS and gender risk assessment for approval, and not as a package by the GCF Board. To provide a context, here are some of the issues experienced by indigenous and local communities residing around the geothermal exploration activities and power plants in Indonesia: • The construction of PLTP Baturraden geothermal plant in Central Java destroyed a waterfall and contaminating rivers essential to the daily needs of villagers. Muds coming from forest clearing led to local communities loosing their livelihoods. • Forest clearing and exploration activities of PLTP Gunung Slamet geothermal plant located on the foot of Mt. Slamet in Central Java caused contamination and flow of mud into the rivers of the area, affecting forest ecosystem. • Villagers living near the geothermal Mataloko in Flores (one of Eastern Sunda Islands) complained about the strong sulfur smell from the plant. The sulfur smoke also affected their crops like cloves, coffee and cacao, which are their sources of income. The smoke also triggered corrosion of the resident roofs that is mainly made of iron sheets. Poverty made them unable to replace their sulfur corrugated their roofs. • Villagers living near the geothermal plant is North Sumatra (financed by the Asian Development Bank with US$ 330 million), suffer from extreme noises coming from the pipes and the cooling system of the plant. • Communities surrounding Mt. Talang in West Sumatra have protested against the planned exploration of a geothermal plant in the forest protected area because they deem the activity will harm the forest ecosystem and may cause floods and land slides. Their protests were responded with intimidation and violence by military forces. These examples are evidences to prove that a geothermal project will not be done in an empty space but in a place where people’s live and livelihoods depend. Therefore, impacts and risks assessment of each geothermal plant must be conducted with active participation especially from indigenous and local communities who will be affected directly. 6. The Gender Action Plan (GAP) is too general and does not assess impacts from this environmentally high-risk project to women. The Gender Action Plan and assessment of the project failed to elaborate on the existing gendered socio-cultural context of communities residing in the project sites. It did not provide an explanation on how women will benefit from geothermal energy projects. It claims to empower women through increased access to electricity and jobs, but it failed to address the negative impacts of the construction of geothermal plants to women’s lands and livelihoods. No redressal mechanism under the World Bank's gender strategy was presented, and the project did not lay down the risks and hazards that may particularly impact women. Indonesia does not have any domestic disaster relief/management plans or mechanisms for addressing power plant breakdowns nor gender provisions for occupational/exposure hazards either. The case of Sidoarjo mud flow, where 40,000 people lost their homes, illustrates the lack of this mechanism. 7. Lack of information and consultation with communities on the sub-project sites. There is no information that the Indonesian NDA to GCF did any public consultation on this project. Because the project sites are yet to be determined, there is no information disclosure to potentially affected indigenous peoples and local communities, nor a consultation conducted. The World Bank, SMI as the Implemented Entity and the Indonesian NDA to GCF must disclose information related to environmental, gender and social impacts of the sub-projects, and do a meaningful consultation with communities will be affected. Since this important procedure was not completed, we urge the Board not to approve FP083. Finally, we would like to remind all of us, the GCF Board Members, the World Bank, SMI and the Indonesian NDA to GCF that geothermal project is not about market and money, but more about people’s lives and livelihood, and the lives of their future generations. Jakarta, October 18, 2018 Concerned Indonesian Civil Society Organizations 1. Aksi! for gender, social and ecological justice 2. Aliansi Kerakyatan untuk Poso, Sulawesi Tengah 3. Aliansi Masyarakat Adat Nusantara (AMAN) 4. Aliansi Perpustakaan Jalanan, Nasional 5. Asosiasi Pengacara Syariah Indonesia, Nasional 6. Banyumas Tolak PLTPB, Jawa Tengah 7. Barisan Rakyat Peduli Lingkungan 8. Bhinneka Ceria, Jawa Tengah 9. BYTRA Lhokseumawe, Aceh 10. Center for Community Development and Education (CCDE) 11.Cilongok Bersatu (CIBER), Jawa Tengah 12.Civil Liberty Defender 13.Damar Pala 14.Daulat Perempuan Maluku Utara, Maluku 15.Farmer's Inititiative for Ecological Livelihoods and Democracy (FIELD) 16. Nasional Informasi dan Komunikasi Organisasi Non Pemerintah (FIK-Ornop), Makassar 17. Flower Aceh, Aceh 18. Masyarakat Konservasi Bantaeng, Sulawesi Selatan 19.Gerakan Mahasiswa Nasionalis Indonesia Kupang, Nusa Tenggara Timur 20.Greenpeace Indonesia 21.Nasional Himpunan Masyarakat Pecinta Alam Gunung Talang, Sumatera Barat 22.Ikatan Mahasiswa Muhammadiyah 23.Nasional Ikatan Mahasiswa Muhammadiyah Universitas Ahmad Dahlan. Yogyakarta 24.Ikatan Pelajar Mandailing Natal, Sumatera Utara 25.IMS3 (Ikatan Mahasiswa Solok Saiyo Sakato) Bukittinggi, Sumatera Barat 26.Indonesia for Global Justice, Nasional 27. Institute for Policy Research and Advocacy (ELSAM), Nasional 28. Institute for Women's Empowerment, Nasional 29.Jaringan Advokasi Tambang (JATAM), Nasional 30.Jendela Post 31.Kalyanamitra, Nasional 32.Kedai JATAM, Jakarta 33.KePPaK Perempuan, Nasional 34.Kesatuan Nelayan Tradisional Indonesia, Nasional 35.Koalisi Perempuan Indonesia, Nasional 36.Koalisi Rakyat untuk Keadilan Perikanan, Nasional 37.Komunitas Masyarakat Adat Yimnawai Gir, Papua 38.Konsorsium Pembaruan Agraria Sulawesi Selatan 39.Lembaga Bantuan Hukum Jakarta, DKI Jakarta 40.Lembaga Bantuan Hukum Medan, Sumatera Utara 41.Lembaga Bantuan Hukum Padang, Sumatera Barat 42.Lembaga Bantuan Hukum Surabaya, Jawa Timur 43.Lembaga Pemberdayaan Perempuan, Bone 44.Lembaga Riset dan Pengembangan Kapasitas Masyarakat (LRPKM), Makassar 45.Lembaga Seniman Budayawan Muslimin Indonesia, Jawa Tengah 46.Liga Mahasiswa Nasional untuk Demokrasi Banyumas, Jawa Tengah 47.Lopo Belajar Gender Kupang, Nusa Tenggara Timur 48.LSM GUGAT, Nasiomal 49.LSM Puan Addisa, Nasional 50.Papuana Conservation 51.PBHI Sumatera Barat 52.Pecinta Alam dan Gunung Rimba Indonesia Slawi, Jawa Tengah 53.Pecinta Alam Mahasiswa Universitas Subang, Jawa Barat 54.Pecinta Alam Teknik Uhamka, Jakarta 55.Pergerakan Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia, Nasional 56.Perkumpulan Pikul, Nusa Tenggara Timur 57.Perkumpulan Tabah Air, Sumatera Selatan 58.PPA Yoga Rimba Purwokerto, Jawa Tengah 59. Save Gunung Slamet, Jawa Tengah 60.Serikat Mahasiswa Progresif (SEMAR) Universitas Indonesia, Jabotabek 61.Serikat Nelayan Indonesia, Nasional 62.Serikat Pengorganisasian Rakyat Indonesia, Nasional 63.Solidaritas Perempuan, Nasional 64.Solidaritas Perempuan Anging Mammiri, Sulawesi Selatan 65.Solidaritas Perempuan Kendari, Sulawesi Tenggara 66.Solidaritas Perempuan Mataram, Nusa Tenggara Barat 67.Solidaritas Perempuan Sebay Lampung, Lampung 68.Solidaritas Perempuan Sintuwu Raya Poso, Sulawesi Tengah 69.Solidaritas Perempuan Sumbawa, Nusa Tenggara Barat 70.Suara Perempuan Desa, Jawa Timur 71.UKBA UNP 72.Wahana Lingkungan Hidup (WALHI), Nasional 73.Walhi Jawa Barat 74.Walhi Kalimantan Timur 75.Walhi Kepulauan Bangka Belitung 76.Walhi Nusa Tenggara Barat 77.Walhi Sulawesi Selatan 78.Walhi Sumatera Barat 79.Yapesdi 80.Yayasan Bina Desa, Nasional 81.Yayasan Lembaga Bantuan Hukum Indonesia, Nasional 82.Yayasan Lembaga Konsumen Sulawesi Selatan 83.Yayasan Perempuan Beskar, Bone 84.Yayasan Pusaka, Nasional Supporting international and regional civil society organization: 1. Asia Pacific Forum on Women, Law and Development (APWLD) 2. Asian-Pacific Resource and Research Centre for Women (ARROW) 3. Asian Peoples Movements on Debt and Development (APMDD) 4. Bangladesh Krishok Federation, Bangladesh 5. Bangladesh Working Group on External Debt (BWGED), Bangladesh 6. Both Ends, the Netherlands 7. Bretton Woods Project, UK 8. NGO Forum on ADB 9. CLEAN (Coastal Livelihood and Environmental Action Network), Bangladesh 10.Climate Watch Thailand 11.Environics Trust, India 12.Friends of the Earth US 13.GenderCC - Women for Climate Justice 14.Heinrich Boell Stiftung North America 15.Human Rights and Development, Mongolia 16.INSAF, India 17.Labour,Health and Human Rights Development Centre, Nigeria 18.Nadi Ghati Morcha, India 19.Nepal Federation of Indigenous Nationalities ( NEFIN) 20. TierrActiva Peru 21. Urgewald #Aksi #Indonesia

DR. JIM YONG KIM President World Bank Dear Pres. Kim; Good day. We are writing to your office regarding the incident that occurred last October 11, 2018, during our Seminar on Environmental and Social Issues at Plagoo Hotel, Bali, Indonesia. At around 3:30 PM on the date cited, 7 men in civilian clothing showed up and demanded for our passports they introduced themselves as immigration officers but only after they were asked. The 20 participants were demanded to surrender their passports under the guise of “surveillance and monitoring”, most of the passports were held for at least 4 hours. The NGO Forum on ADB strongly condemns this show of threat and intimidation by the Indonesian authorities. Our civil society network underwent all the necessary protocols indicated by the World Bank to participate in the WB-IMF Annual Meeting. The Forum was holding the activity in a peaceful assembly and this was a clear threat in the continuing clampdown of CSOs. It is distressing that WB-IMF group cannot ensure the security and dignity of its invited guests. Consequently, we urge the World Bank Group and the International Monetary Fund group to: The World Bank Group should protect this democratic space to those who voice out their dissent in the adverse impacts of development financing. The Bank raise this issue directly with the Indonesian Government, their partner and host of this meeting, which saw unprecedented intimidation of local civil society groups and cancellation of civil society events in an unacceptable manner. NGO Forum on ADB demands a full accounting for the decision-makers involved in this harassment of NGOs, including a report by the Bank on the result of the discussions on this topic with the government of Indonesia. When there are any forms of harassment, threat or intimidation, the Bank should take all necessary measures to prevent as well as mitigate further harm and strongly denounce such acts of repression either by the Bank itself or the host country. In addition, we urge careful monitoring of all planned World Bank projects in the country with specific attention to and reporting on the use of threats, intimidation or violence against local populations and civil society organizations with specific attention to the use of coercion in the context of meaningful consultation required for the World Bank in the implementation of its projects. If the Bank cannot guarantee meaningful consultation free of coercion for its projects, clearly investments will need to be reconsidered. Given the failure of the WB to ensure the safety of those who are attending their Annual Meeting events, there are clearly significant concerns about the safety of local organizations that would questions or concerns about WB projects implemented in Indonesia. The World Bank Group and IMF should ensure its commitments to fundamental human rights particularly the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association; and the right to freedom of opinion and expression that needs to be respected at all times. We seek a full report from the World Bank regarding the unprecedented intimidation of civil society organizations and suppression of civil society events during the WB-IMF annual meeting and clarification regarding the manner by which the Bank will ensure this kind of incident never happens again. Respectfully, NGO Forum on ADB Endorsed by: 11.11.11 Accountability Counsel Accountability Project Action Paysanne Contre la Faim African Ressources Watch (AFREWATCH) Aksi! for gender, social and ecological justice, Indonesia Bank Information Center (BIC) BIC Europe Both ENDS Buliisa Initiative for Rural Development Organisation (BIRUDO) Center for International Environmental Law Centre for Human Rights and Development Coastal Livelihood and Environmental Action Network (CLEAN), Bangladesh Community Empowerment and Social Justice Foundation (CEMSOJ), Nepal COMPPART Foundation for Justice and Peacebuilding Conseil Régional des organisations non gouvernementales de Crude Accountability Derecho Ambiente y Recursos Naturales Développement signe Economic & Social Rights Centre - Hakijamii Equitable Cambodia Forest Peoples programme Friends of the Earth US Friends with Environment in Development Gender Action Inclusive Development International Indigenous Perspectives Initiative for Right View (IRV) Interamerican Association for Environmental Defense (AIDA) Jamaa Resource Initiatives, Kenya Legal Rights and Natural Resources Center,.--Kasama sa Kalikasan/Friends of the Earth Philippines (LRCKSK/FoE Phils) Manipur Cycle Club Manushya Foundation Nadi Ghati Morcha, India Nash Vek Public Foundation Network Movement For Justice And Development (NMJD) NGO "Youth Group on Protection of Environment"/YGPE Oil Change International Oil Workers' Rights Protection Organization Public Union Open Azerbaijan Initiatives Participatory Development Initiatives [PDI] Rivers without Boundaries Ulu Foundation Urgewald Download letter here. #worldbank #IMF #Bali #Indonesia

While the Asian Development Bank (ADB) celebrates the 10th year anniversary of their Accountability Mechanism, project affected communities are still in grief over the loss of their properties, their livelihood, and their rights. “I was evicted in my own home,” Srey Van recounted, he is a public school teacher forcibly displaced in the Cambodia Railway Rehabilitation Project. Upon visiting the resettlement site in Battambang a few years back, he narrated that it has been eight years since the project has been implemented yet there are still families who have not received additional compensation. There is still shortage in potable water in some of the relocation sites and communities are still experiencing difficulty of going to the city for lack of public transportation. Similarly, Maribeth Garcia, a mother of five raised her reservations in the construction of Visayas Baseload Development Project in the Philippines “I fear for my children’s health in the future,” she stated. The ADB Accountability Mechanism according to NGO Forum's Annabel Perreras, former ADB Policy Coordinator is simply “a functional necessity designed to protect the autonomy and independence of international organizations including the ADB against interference in discharging its entrusted functions effectively”. Eang Vuthy of Equitable Cambodia said “the legitimacy of the Accountability Mechanism is compromised whenever a potential conflict of interest arises at the ADB Board Compliance Review Committee (BCRC) level.” He also added that “…as per the policy, the CRP will investigate alleged non – compliance by ADB with its operational policies and procedures in any ADB – assisted project”. Rayyan Hassan, executive director of NGO Forum on ADB said that “this goes back to the question of ADB enjoying immunity, the Bank should be stripped off its immunity because it continues to peddle on the illusion that it is an institution committed in the principles of transparency, accountability and responsible development financing”. There have been attempts of filing cases on domestic courts and form a narrative of challenging immunity of international financial institutions. Environmental and human rights group EarthRights International (ERI) on behalf of the affected fishing communities sued the International Finance Corporation (IFC) in a federal court in D.C. over the IFC – funded Tata Mundra Coal Power Plant. ERI also filed a federal lawsuit on behalf of Honduran farmers on the IFC investment on Corporación Dinant S.A. de C.V. “Time and again ADB has contributed in the perilous situation Asia is facing in the midst of the rising inequality, illegitimate debts, environmental degradation, displacement and increasing vulnerability of the poor,” Hassan added.

10 September 2018 JIN LIQUN President Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank B9 Financial Street, Xicheng District Beijing 10033 People’s Republic of China Copied to: Dr. Joachim von Amsberg, Vice President – Policy and Strategy Mr. Hamid Sharif, Compliance, Effectiveness and Integrity Unit (CEIU) Director General Dr. Somnath Basu, Senior Social Development Specialist Ms. Laurel Ostfield, Head of Communications and Development Members of the Board of Directors of the AIIB Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank’s (AIIB) Paper on the Accountability Framework: Reflections from Civil Society The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank’s Accountability Framework should be analyzed and monitored simultaneously alongside the provisions set forth on the Paper, Regulation and the Decision on the said Framework [1]. The Paper was adopted on 11 April 2018 and the Regulation shall be effective by 1 January 2019. We re-echo our 6 April 2018 input sent to the AIIB that, “This decision goes to the heart of the question of governance at the Bank. Board members are accountable to their constituent governments, shareholders of the AIIB, for their decisions. Shareholder governments in turn are responsible to their citizens for ensuring that the Bank upholds its environmental and social standards in its lending operations. In essence, the project approval process by the Board provides an opportunity for civil society and potentially affected communities to raise their concerns with their representatives, to ensure decisions are well-informed and take account of potential harms." Introduction 1. Accordingly, the Accountability Framework (AF) states that its purpose is to “clearly demarcate the role of the Board of Directors (BoD) and the President with respect to the financing operations of the Bank (para. 1).” The Paper also indicates measures by which the BoD will use to hold the President accountable. 2. However deeper reflections suggest that significant powers will be transferred from the Board to the President on project approval authority. The underlying rationale behind the document is to further fast track the AIIB loan approval process, which is already much ahead of other international financial institutions (IFIs)[2]. Nonetheless, there should not be a trade-off between the speed of approval of financing a project and the corresponding due diligence requirements of ensuring that any likely adverse harm will be mitigated, if not avoided. 3. The introduction alarmingly implies that further transfer of powers will be vested by the Board to the President, i.e. “…proportion of projects to be considered for approval by the President will increase very gradually over time… (para. 4)”. While this can be interpreted as a phased approach, the ambiguity and lack of guidelines pose risks on how the Bank will implement this new scheme of approving projects. For instance, if 2016 – 2017 will be the baseline for the Bank, does it have targets on how many projects will be approved by the President within the 18 – 36 months?[3] Accordingly, efficiency is one of the objectives of this “new model of governance”. How then will this be assessed vis-à-vis the quality-at-entry, project readiness as well as ensuring a robust implementation of the Bank’s Environmental and Social Framework among others? While the Bank may argue that this can be covered in the review itself, discussions around this should start early on. 4. On the details of implementation, the AF loosely frames that “Board of Governors, the BoD and the President have or will shortly put in place the key documents necessary to ensure the Bank operates with high standards, the time is right to move to the next stage of developing the AIIB’s governance model (para. 7) (Note: emphasis supplied)”. 5. If the “key documents” being pertained to are the Environmental and Social Policy, Public Information Interim Policy (PIIP), other sectoral strategies, etc. to ensure the “Bank operates with high standards”, these still fall short with respect to the genuine consultation processes that should go through in developing these documents, e.g. translation of policy documents at least in key local languages; lack of AIIB’s consistent feedback mechanism in integrating CSO comments; providing response on instances where comments cannot be considered, etc. Despite these legitimate concerns, CSOs question how the timing can be appropriate in moving to the purportedly “next stage of developing AIIB’s governance model”. 6. Furthermore, looking at the AIIB’s operations since 2016, there is a significant lack of transparency on its information disclosure on all phases of the project cycle from the selection to project implementation. With the authority shifting to the AIIB Headquarters in Beijing, China where the President holds office, this further distances the Bank from public scrutiny. 7. In addition, the Bank at present has yet to approve its Policy on Public Information (PPI) and its Project-Affected People’s Mechanism (PPM). Furthermore, there is also the absence of Environmental Social Framework Guidelines for Implementation. Notwithstanding these critical policies to enable the Bank to “improve social and economic outcomes in Asia”, it has already approved 24 projects without any of these basic binding requirements. On the Role of BoD – Policy and Strategy 8. According to the AF, the BoD is “responsible for the direction of the general operations of AIIB, including setting the Bank’s policies and strategy and for overseeing their implementation (para. 5)”. Furthermore, the BoD “drives strategy through sector strategies and the Business Plan and Budget (BPB). These strategies include objectives, approaches and a monitoring framework to track strategy implementation (paras. 10 - 11)”. 9. The Bank has approved the Energy Sector Strategy and the Transport Strategy both of which are very lean documents. There is no detailed monitoring framework nor implementation guidelines for these strategies in the public domain as of now. The Operational Policy on International Relations recently approved by the BoD also gives AIIB the license to finance “de facto” governments and finance through international waterways. As opposed to this provision, there are no objectives, approaches and monitoring frameworks out to evaluate the implementation of these policies. 10. The following are identified as tools for the BoD to oversee Policy and Strategy Implementation: “Directives concerned with implementing a Policy and Strategy will be shared one week to the BoD prior to being issued by the President… (para. 13)”; “The main instrument through which the BoD directs the President in the operationalization of strategies and policies is the annual Business Plan and Budget (para. 14)”; “The BPB also includes quantitative and qualitative milestones to allow the BoD to monitor progress and hold the President accountable. This framework will allow Board members to assess, on a quarterly basis, AIIB’s performance. The indicators approved in each sector strategy are the building blocks of the Bank’s results framework, which will be fully developed by the time AIIB’s first Corporate Strategy is approved (para. 15)”. 11. This is the first mention of a broader AIIB Strategy since its inception in 2016. The AF further elaborates on the Corporate Strategy, i.e. “By 2021 AIIB will be operating under its first Corporate Strategy. This Strategy will outline a medium-term framework that integrates existing and future sectoral strategies, thematic priorities and core institutional principles, values and goals, and will also lay a Bank-wide foundation for the next phase of growth and for evaluating the results that AIIB aims to achieve (para. 17)”. 12. “AIIB’s strategy will be implemented within a set of risk thresholds agreed by the BoD. The BoD approved the Risk Appetite Statement (RAS) in January 2018 and will be asked annually to approve the specific levels of top-down risk allocation (para. 18)”. 13. While the BOD is opting to relinquish portion of its approval authority of projects to the President, the question of investment, social and environmental risk requires more in depth attention. Is the RAS open for public scrutiny? How will it be updated? What are its parameters for risk assessment? These questions will become more important as the AF will be implemented. Critical Issues with regards to Delegation Principles and Project Approval Process 14. In realizing the potential risk of losing powers to management, the AF introduces a very critical clause into it for the BoD to retain its full powers - “The Articles of Agreement (AoA) confer the power to delegate authority for project approvals to the President. The BoD retains authority in these matters and may decide in future to amend or withdraw the authority that is delegated by these provisions (para. 19)”. Through this provision the BoD may invoke the AF to be withdrawn in cases where they feel that the President may have over extended his powers beyond what the AF permits. 15. The subsequent categories under para. 19 are deemed exceptions to the AF which need to be closely monitored by the civil society: Category I – Precedent Setting: The first sovereign-backed project in a Member. The first non-sovereign-backed project in a Member. The first project in a sector in each Member. The first projects using a previously unused financing instrument, e.g. if AIIB for the first time lends to a bank for on-lending or provides subordinated debt. The first project involving a particular co-financier in which AIIB proposes to apply one or several policies of such co-financier. Category II – Significant Strategic and Policy Issues: A project in a non-regional Member. A project where a corresponding Sector Strategy has not yet been approved by the BoD. A Project requiring a policy derogation, e.g., in terms of risk limits or procurement policy requirements. A project which directly implicates the Operational Policy on International Relations. The Bank proposes to finance projects to “de facto” governments and across international waterways. This will directly lead to severe impacts on conflicted areas, and coastal zone with complex social dynamics. Category III – Risk Tolerances - a project that falls into one of the following categories: 16. The amount of AIIB’s economic capital (ECap) utilized by the Bank’s financing in a project is in excess of $25 million. The Category III on Risk Tolerance also limits the Bank’s perception to financial risks alone. The Accountability Framework is void of any indication that the potential environmental and social risks and harm would also be a factor in deciding if the project will be approved by the BoD or the President. According to investment managers, Economic capital is the amount of risk capital held by a financial services company (in this case AIIB) to enable it to survive any difficulties such as market or credit risks. The amount is determined internally by shareholders (AIIB BoD), often using a measure of portfolio risk such as var, i.e., value at risk. 17. The amount of AIIB’s financing for a project is in excess of any one of the following amounts: $200 million in case of sovereign-backed financing or guarantees. $100 million in case of non-sovereign-backed financing or guarantees. $35 million in case of equity investments. 18. Para. 20 elaborates that “the objective of setting financing thresholds is to assure that: 1) the riskier transactions are to be considered by the BoD…”. The specific limits proposed under (j) of paragraph 19 are derived from Management’s analysis of the ECap relative to target credit ratings. An ECap limit of $25 million translates to a notional limit of about $300 million for a BB rated borrower (the average portfolio target rating) for sovereign-backed projects and about $150 million for a BB-rated borrower (the average portfolio target rating) for non-sovereign backed projects. 19. According to regulatory and credit rating standards, AIIB has a AAA rating which suggests that as an obligor it has extremely strong capacity to meet its financial commitments. It is important to note that AF now allows AIIB President to approve loans to BB and BB-rated borrowers, who are perceived in the near term and long term to be more financially risky to meet their financial obligations. 19. In other words, BB and BB rating may be more vulnerable to significant uncertainties and exposure to adverse business, financial or economic conditions which could lead to the obligor's inadequate capacity to meet its financial commitments. Through this framework, the BoD is relinquishing significant oversight on BB and BB-rated borrowers and this should be an area of long term concern for AIIB’s risk considerations. 20. Para. 23 states, “A Director may ask that a project be considered and decided upon by the BoD at any time from the first time a project is included in the pipeline until a date which is fourteen (14) calendar days after Management provides the BoD with a final Project Summary Document (PSD)”. 21. On this note since 2016 the AIIB has been grossly inadequate in providing project-related information upstream in the project cycle, especially during the pipeline/ proposed project phase. Without adequate information regarding each project in the pipeline, the BoD may not have adequate information in order to dutifully exercise its right to implement key exceptions or pull up a project for board review. At present the current Policy on Public Information has also not been approved. 22. Para. 27 reemphasizes the need for reviewing the AF within 3 years (and mid-term review within 18 months) and states “… The review will include, but not be limited to, the delegation principles (including call-in rights), modalities of delegation and information sharing processes. It will also include an in-depth review, undertaken by the Compliance, Effectiveness and Integrity Unit (CEIU), of a sample of projects subjected to delegated approval to ensure that the decisions were robust and aligned with the BoD-approved policies and strategies”. 23. In the AF, this is the first time CEIU is mentioned and given a key role in the review process of the AF. It needs to be noted that the independence of the CEIU will be absolutely critical to the performance and review of the AF. BoD’s tools for holding the President accountable 24. Para. 37 describes in detail the role and responsibility of the CEIU in the accountability of the President in implementing the AF and its functions: “The President has established the CEIU that reports directly to the BoD. CEIU combines three functions traditionally carried out at other MDBs by different units. CEIU consolidates the integrity (fraud and corruption related to projects), project complaints and project evaluation functions under one roof. This allows for greater synergy between these functions, especially in deriving lessons learned, and supports the BoD in its supervisory role. To reinforce this synergy, the President has invited the Managing Director of CEIU to attend the Management Meeting and Executive Committee as an observer. This aims to ensure that CEIU is well informed of important decision-making, and also positions the Unit to play a constructive role in expeditiously raising concerns with Management for resolution. When issues cannot be resolved by Management, and without compromising the confidentiality of discussions and decisions within the Management and Executive Committees, CEIU has the ability to report them to the BoD. CEIU will also play a key role in the rigorous and independent evaluation of the performance of projects, thereby providing the BoD with an essential metric for supervising the project approval authority delegated to the President”. 25. There are no structural checks and balances between the CEIU’s role in the Management Meeting and the Executive Committee meeting. One cannot rule out the potential of compromise that the working environment, office culture and other unofficial exchanges between Management and CEIU may have on the AF evaluation. This is an alarming concern considering the scale of the finances and the impacts the projects may have on the ground. On Holding the President Accountable 26. The AF in the remaining sections alludes to, “The primary tool for BoD to ensure that the President is operationalizing BoD approved policies and strategies is the BPB (emphasis supplied).” In addition, “… The President also reports to the BoD on how the financing program is supporting the thematic and sector priorities. The President and the BoD continue to discuss further sharpening of the strategic priorities and how best to report on these to the BoD”. 27. The AF points towards three lines of defense on the AF implementation. All three are headed by management positions including the VP for Strategy and Policy/ Chief Compliance Officer, the Chief Risk Officer and the Chief Auditor. Outside these three positions the CEIU is entrusted with independent evaluation of the AF and President and reporting to the BoD. Will these three management-led lines of defense be objective to the evaluation of the AF? Will CEIU conduct itself independently and fulfill all material obligations as articulated in para. 37? These are questions which can only be answered once the AF is set into operation. 29. In conclusion, civil society must continually monitor the AF and engage the BoD continually on AIIB operational realities. CSOs will remain steadfast in demanding the public release of all monitoring and evaluation frameworks, guidance notes and project related information to ensure that the Accountability Framework does not allow the AIIB HQ to operate away from Board of Directors’ oversight and full transparency. Signed: NGO Forum on ADB Accountability Counsel (USA) Asian Peoples' Movement on Debt and Development (APMDD) Bangladesh NGOs Network for Radio and Communication (BNNRC) Banktrack BIC Europe Cayan Bdr. Adhikakau, Nepal Center of Bird Lovers CLEAN (Coastal Livelihoods and Environmental Action Network) Coal/Nuclear Free Bataan Movement Philippines Environics Trust Environmental public alliance, Armenia Equitable Cambodia GreenID, Vietnam Inclusive Development International Indian Social Action Forum (INSAF) Indigenous Perspectives, India Jamaa Resource Initiatives, Kenya Lumière Synergie pour le Développement Mladi Za Zemiato, Bulgaria Nash Vek Public Foundation, Kyrgyzstan Oil Workers' Rights Protection Organization Public Union, Azerbaijan Oyu Tolgoi Watch, Mongolia Pakistani Fisher Folks (PFF) Public Association for Assistance to Free Economy (Azerbaijan) Rivers without Boundaries Coalition SANLAKAS Solutions for Our Climate, South Korea Umeedenoo Organization, Pakistan Urgewald, Germany ULU Foundation, USA VSEA, Vietnam WomanHealth, Philippines [1] Source: https://www.aiib.org/en/about-aiib/governance/accountability-framework/index.html [2] Note: In the case of the ADB, its current Transitional Results Framework 2017 – 2020 does not have an indicator measuring the processing time from concept clearance to Board approval. However according to the 2017 Development Effectiveness Review, sovereign operations processing time (from start of loan fact – finding to Board approval), it takes 7.7 months in 2017 which is slower than the baseline value of 5.7 months in 2016. Whereas for non – sovereign operations processing time (from start of due diligence to Board approval), it takes 7.4 months in 2017 with a 9.0 months baseline value in 2016. [3] Period by which AIIB set that a mid – term and comprehensive review for the Framework will take place respectively. Download letter here. #AIIB #AccountabilityFramework #JinLiqun

Excerpts from the Study on The Proposed Business Model of AIIB China’s role in global finance and its emergence as a dominant economic power nowadays is being felt all over the world and is a critical factor in re-shaping the Asia-Pacific region’s development. Eighty percent of Chinese assistance in the Asia and the Pacific is in the form of concessional loans[1], mostly in the transport sector.[2] In 2015, the Chinese Government kicked off several investments along its much-vaunted New Silk Road[3] flooding these investments into countries in Central Asia and Africa. Over the third quarter of 2015 alone, 17 out of 19 Government loans were disbursed, constituting some 90% of China’s overseas lending during the period. China’s aid focus is distinctly in the productive sector, particularly in energy, transport and storage. In the Pacific, China is now the third largest aid provider, following Australia and the U.S. and is number one in Fiji, investing $332.96 million from 2006 to 2013. Data also show that it is the third-largest shareholder in the World Bank (WB). And as such, makes it an important contributor to the International Development Association (IDA), the institution's fund for the poor, and the Global Infrastructure Facility (GIF), an international platform that facilitates the preparation and structuring of infrastructure public-private partnerships.[4] In 2013, Chinese foreign aid was placed at $7.1 billion making it the world’s sixth largest bilateral donor, just after France. China has already signed 12 free-trade agreements and plans to negotiate with 65 more countries along the Silk Route. Those already in place include Singapore, Pakistan, Chile, Peru, Costa Rica, Iceland, Switzerland, Hong Kong and Taiwan and a further eight are under negotiation with Japan, Korea, Australia, Sri Lanka, Norway, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN, and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).[1][1] Cheung, Francis, Head of China-HK strategy, Lee, Alexious, Head of China Industrial Research for CLSA, an independent brokerage and investment group. 2015. “A Brilliant Plan One Belt One Road”. But even before, China has already been a significant player in global infrastructure financing with support coming from its policy and commercial banks and other state-backed investment funds for outbound infrastructure investments. Through Figure 1: Circle of influence: China is working with 60 nations to construct a modern-day Silk Road – by land and sea (Map Courtesy of China Dialogue) its “Going Out Strategy”, it has promoted Chinese companies to expand overseas, utilizing surplus foreign exchange and increase access to global markets, natural resources, and technology. Policy banks such as the China Development Bank and Export-Import Bank (Eximbank) have been major drivers of this strategy; which have been set up to support the policy objectives of the Government. China has established various investment funds in recent years such as the Silk Road Fund while injecting additional capital into its policy banks specifically to support overseas operations. Through the Belt Road Initiative (BRI), the country has even more renewed its support and commitment to outbound capitalization and investments. What is in it for China and the Region? With Asia’s economic growth in the past decade, this has likewise led to the growth of energy consumption and the required massive amount of investment towards infrastructure development. A number of sub-regional initiatives on oil, gas, coal, nuclear, and power transmissions are now being planned, either in the pipeline or are already being implemented. The region has seen significant increase in infrastructure investment between 2009 and 2013, accounting for more than 50% of the global increase in capital spending. But at the same time, it is said that in order to maintain these current levels of economic growth, Asia will need to spend approximately US$8 trillion[1]. And to sustain this, it will be necessary to inject between US$800 billion and US$1.3 trillion annually into infrastructure projects between now and 2030[2]. All these are needed in order to resolve its serious shortage of roads, railways, ports, power stations and other basic facilities that threaten to hold back some of the world’s fastest growing economies. On the other hand, China aims to benefit economically and politically from these infrastructure projects and given its controlling interest in the Asian Infrastructure Bank (AIIB), is “conceived to be China’s instrument”, allowing it to generate and direct investments to strengthen such interests.[3] But there is also the fact that there is now a domestic economic slowdown in the country characterized by lower demand for construction and industrial materials from other countries. For China, it is said to be taking steps to address the issue by actively encouraging companies to export excess capacity overseas (not to mention oversupply and overproduction).[4] China Encircles the World with its BRI Policy[5] With the search for domestic economic growth as the main motivation, BRI is said to be ultimately “a domestic policy with geo-strategic consequences” rather than a foreign policy. Beijing continues to provide domestic companies with the experience to become global brands. An interesting element of BRI is that it is said to be well integrated into China’s provincial government objectives; where all 31 Chinese provinces have indicated that they will actively participate. Two-thirds of these provinces have included it as a development priority and have featured it in their annual work plans for the coming years that include trade and bilateral investment targets. These provincial governments have committed to raising the “support level of credit” to help participating enterprises, offer training to local enterprises to apply for national funds, and provide further subsidy. BRI is also viewed as China’s Marshall Plan[6] with a long-term goal of gaining geopolitical pre-eminence and creating a new geostrategic landscape in the Eurasian continent. In this context, it is also deemed as an economic countermeasure to USA’s rebalancing in the Asia Pacific.[7] At the same time it is pointed out that “with the expansion of the Eurasian transport infrastructure”, the Chinese Government is laying the foundations for a “new China-centered production networks” with Chinese companies moving production to Southeast Asia and opening up new trade routes, markets, and “sources of energy” that China needs to sustain its growth. BRI’s potentials for trade links and economic opportunities BRI could have a lasting impact if it contributes to enhanced trade links. It is said that the areas it covers include about 50 percent of the world’s GDP and roughly the same share of global trade. Reduced transport costs could increase trade flows and bring in the benefits of greater competition and efficiency through harmonized trading systems. Reduced tariffs and simplified customs administration would allow trade to flow seamlessly between countries including China. But looking closely into the plan that is taking in every conceivable goal from improving distributed supply chains to developing trade services, to possibilities of increasing food security for the countries participating in the project, it remains to be “gran” and a statement of ambitions that could likely favor pet projects and bureaucratic leaders along the route. Perceived Challenges on Governance and Accountability and CSO Concerns The BRI vision and plan makes it clear that “infrastructure development” projects and investments are seldom politically neutral, and not necessarily economically beneficial. As far as direct economic gains go, the long-term benefits might not merit the shorter term political, economic and environmental factors and vulnerabilities. This is especially the case for fragile and conflict-affected countries where many of them have weak or absent systems of governance. Too single-minded economic and investment-driven decision-making is less concerned with the “externalities” related to the use of natural resources, inclusive growth, and impacts to societies and communities. “Channeling additional resources without attention to complex and ever-shifting political dynamics could add further risks and serve to reinforce powerful interests. Supporting development progress in such complex and high-risk environments requires that any bank or private support adopts a politically informed approach to engagement”.[1] If BRI continues to have large-scale outpouring of capital, enterprises, and building of large infrastructure projects as it promises, then consequences are clear and eminent. According to OXFAM data, large-scale infrastructure is one of the main causes of forced displacement globally. Dams have caused between 40-80 million people world-wide to lose their homes who depend on their land or on access to natural resources for their living. Displacement literally means losing their ability to support their families, grow crops, fish and continue their cultural and social practices. Environmental impacts on livelihoods are potentially the most devastating especially among vulnerable communities across borders.[2] The actual roll-out of the plan is going to depend on factors related to country conditions and investment interest. Consequently, the absence of clear cut plans, mechanisms for implementation and formal agreement procedures could lead to more issues and problems that may not necessarily favor beneficiary countries, in particular those fragile and conflict countries. Risks have been identified and measures will have to be implemented to significantly improve the situation through a kind of a unified environmental and social requirements and criteria for all project investments made in BRI countries. With this, it is vital for domestic and international policies to reinforce each other in monitoring and ensuring that the BRI project will lead to sustainable development. Emerging Engagement Strategy for Civil Society Organizations Build on experiences in order to engage and influence AIIB and gain traction in its advocacy work and likewise on its existing knowledge, experiences, contacts, and action groups; It is time to direct our lobby work towards our respective country leaders; Understand the functioning of private investors and companies as well as financial intermediaries; Learn about and document the “language and mechanisms” for finance, trade and investments; Further “harmonize” actions on global, national and local levels; Set up, identify and build “new” alliances; Engage banks and push for their operational guidelines and “disclosure criteria” to explicitly include non-financial risks, environmental, social, and human rights risks during pre-approval, approval and actual operation of proposed projects. * Luz Julieta Ligthart is the Policy Coordinator on AIIB, NGO Forum on ADB ** You may download the full research here. --- [1] Stephen, Monica. International Alert. October 2014. Fragile Reforms: World Bank and Asian Development Bank Financing in fragile and conflict-affected situations. [2] www.oxfam.org [1] ADB/ADB Institute. 2009, Infrastructure for a Seamless Asia, Ortigas, MM. [2] World Economic Forum and PwC. 2012, ‘Strategic Infrastructure: Steps to prioritize and deliver infrastructure effectively and efficiently’. [3] From the Author’s view, this notion of AIIB becoming an instrument of China remains contentious given that no evidence has proven this nor have any investigations been conducted to support this. It is vital though, to identify these project sites as these will be where advocacy actions will be most needed. [4] Goh, B and Qing, K.G. Sept 2015. China’s One Belt, One Road looks to take contruction binge offshore, Reuters. [5] Based on the article by Tom Hancock, Financial Times, May 4, 2017. [6] The “Marshall Plan” or European Recovery Program aimed to help in the recovery of European economy after the end of the WWII and was a short-term program (1947-1951). Similarly, the Chinese OBOR proposal attempts to attain a win-win situation for China and participating countries. See more at: http://www.chinausfocus.com/finance-economy/china-advances-its-one-belt-one-road-strategy /#sthash.ufZjOEGm.dpuf. [7] There are existing Agreements where China is not included such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) countries, the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership and the EU-Japan agreement that show comprehensive liberalization agenda and have the potential to increase trading costs. Recently, US has dropped out from TPP. [1] These loans are extended on terms substantially more generous than market loans. The concessionality is achieved either through interest rates below those available on the market or by grace periods, or a combination of these. Concessional loans typically have long grace periods. [2] These data were included in a report by Asia Foundation for its forum that brought together leading Chinese researchers and policy makers with international development experts for China’s Overseas Development Policy in a World “Beyond Aid,” the latest in its Asian Approaches to Development Cooperation dialogue series as reported by Mulakala, Anthea. June 17, 2015. [3] Launched by China in 2013, known as “One Belt, One Road” (OBOR) with the aim to connect major Eurasian economies through infrastructure, trade and investment. It contains two international trade connections: the land-based "Silk Road Economic Belt" and oceangoing "Maritime Silk Road”. It is now more popularly known as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). [4] 2015. “Multilateral organizations to promote effective ways of member nations working together”. #AIIB #AsianInfrastructureInvestmentBank #AIIBAGM2018 Written by Ms. Luz Rio Ligthart, NGO Forum on ADB's AIIB Policy Coordinator